THE FERTILIZER CRUNCH
China maintains tight control over fertilizer trade through export restrictions, customs inspections, and import quotas aimed at prioritizing domestic supply and stabilizing prices. China has operated an administrative export control and inspection regime (CIQ) since late 2021 to adjust fertilizer export volumes in response to domestic price conditions. Controls were binding through 2022-2024. Urea exports fell from about 5-6 MMT in 2021 to just 0.26 MMT in 2024, while DAP exports de- clined from a pre-restriction baseline of about 6.2 MMT per year to 4.6 MMT in 2024. In 2025, the regime shifted toward a more structured quota-based system with guidance pricing, allowing a partial recovery in exports. Urea exports rose to 5.8 MMT in 2025.
The global picture
China, Russia, Egypt and Indonesia together account for roughly 35 percent of global total exports and 47 percent of non-Gulf nitrogen and phosphate exports in 2020-2021, according to data from S&P Global Trade Atlas. All four countries have implemented some form of export quotas or restrictions since then, largely taken to maintain lower domestic prices.
Their combined posture determines how much residual supply reaches world markets. Figures 1 and 2 show exports across these four countries from 2000 to 2025, revealing significant tightening during 2022-2024 in both nitrogen (urea and ammonium nitrate) and phosphate (MAP – monoammonium phosphate – and DAP) fertilizer markets.
Russia has been moving in a more permissive direction even as other exporters have tightened. However, its quota system remains a structural le- ver Russia could pull tighter if circumstances changed. Russia introduced biannual urea and am- monium nitrate export quotas in December 2021 and has extended them repeatedly since then. The current quota for December 2025- May 2026 is set at about 18.7 MMT. In April 2026, the government announced a further increase to 20 MMT for June-November 2026, including roughly 8.7 MMT for ni- trogen fertilizers and over 7 MMT for compound fertilizers, along- side a separate 4.2 MMT quota for ammonium nitrate.
Russia
China
Egypt
Strait of Hormuz
Indonesia
Iran
Oman
UAE
Oman
Egypt maintains two main structural limits on fertilizer exports. It curtails fertilizer production seasonally, as natural gas is reallocated to the power sector during summer peak demand. A long-standing domestic supply obligation requires producers to allocate 55 percent of output to the local market, with the remaining 45 percent permitted for export. The September 2025 gas price reform adjusted this balance by raising the export share to 55 percent and reducing the domestic allocation to 45 percent, tightening local supply conditions. Periodic plant shutdowns due to interrupted Israeli liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, most notably in May 2025 and June 2025, temporarily halted Egyptian urea output (LNG being a key input in urea production) before deliveries were resumed and operations restored.
Indonesia is positioned as a swing supplier during the Hormuz crisis, as state-owned Pupuk Indonesia is the largest urea producer in the Asia-Pacific region. Several countries have requested supply. While the country’s Presidential regulation Perpres 113/2025 prioritizes domestic urea supply ahead of export licensing, an export quota of approximately 1.5 MMT can be deployed flexibly depending on domestic conditions. Indonesia therefore represents swing capacity that can move in either direction depending on policy priorities.
Read the full essay (free) here:
https://www.ifpri.org/blog/how-fertilizer-policies- %20could%20exacerbate-hormuz-price-shocks/
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